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Resettling Peoples, Redressing 
Histories: Challenging Answers 
to the Land Question 
in Namibia and the Netherlands
Liora Barba
I. Introduction
Nearly a decade after national liberation in South Africa and 
Namibia, demonstrators outside of the 2002 United Nations Con-
ference on Development filled the streets of Johannesburg with the 
resounding melodies of apartheid protest songs. Meanwhile, inside 
the conference gates, former President Thabo Mbeki called for an “end 
to global apartheid.”
That same year, in the small city of Hilversum, Dutch politician Pim 
Fortuyn was shot dead. Known for his nationalist, right-wing politics, 
Fortuyn emerged as a prominent political figure, acquiring a cult fol-
lowing by appealing to anti-immigrant sentiment. His death inspired a 
resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia in a country that once stood 
for integration and tolerance.
These seemingly disconnected incidents demonstrate how, at both 
the local and the global level, people remain divided. As activists 
around the world organize under the rallying cry to fight global apart-
heid, disparities in rights to space and access to resources and social 
services persist at the local level. Macalester College’s study abroad 
program, Globalization in Comparative Perspective, granted me the 
invaluable opportunity to explore firsthand this dynamic interplay of 
the local and the global. Over the course of my semesters of study in 
Namibia and the Netherlands, I explored the spatial dimensions of this 
global phenomenon, looking at the meaning of segregation and the 
politics of place in the global age.
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To narrow this broad study, I focus on two specific populations and 
national contexts: the San in Namibia and the Moluccan community in 
the Netherlands. Grounded in these case studies, I examine the persis-
tence of socio-spatial marginalization and inequity before moving on 
to analyze the impact of global forces on these national and localized 
conflicts. In Namibia, I examine how the land reform process serves as 
a means of transcending the infrastructure of apartheid. In the Neth-
erlands, I look at the evolution of the Moluccan community following 
postcolonial resettlement. Exploring the politicization and social con-
structions of ethnic identities in each context, I critique the ideology 
and design of resettlement and reform programs. I also assess failures 
in the implementation process, highlighting how these initiatives can 
ultimately reinforce the marginal social status of the very people that 
they claim to serve.
This exploration is based on the premise that social and political 
dynamics are reflected through spatial organization. I hope to illumi-
nate the underlying power structures that perpetuate spatial inequal-
ity at both the national and international level.
Further, I examine the role of these conflicts in the process of post-
conflict reconciliation in the context of international justice. In addition, 
I explore how transnational advocacy initiatives that claim to empower 
can inadvertently perpetuate narratives that reinforce the socio-spatial 
marginalization of those on whose behalf they claim to advocate.
To carry out this study, I utilize a combination of academic texts 
and critical conversations in the places that were the subject, as well as 
the location, of my study. I reviewed literature in the social sciences, 
various media sources, non-profit groups, government organizations, 
and international governing bodies involved in issues of migration, 
resettlement, and integration. To lend perspective to my reading of 
these texts, I interviewed individuals involved in social services and 
public advocacy.
II. Transforming the Political Landscape: 
Resettlement Policies in Namibia and the Netherlands
Though globalization demands a re-evaluation of the nation-state, it 
does not render it irrelevant. Rather, it is a process that calls into ques-
tion governmental obligations as it transforms the nature of national 
affiliations. Recognizing this integral, albeit changing, role of the state 
in the global era, I have chosen to focus on policy. While land reform 
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has become the focus of heated debate in post-apartheid Namibia, 
the challenges of integrating and understanding a growing immigrant 
population has taken center stage in the Dutch political arena. From 
rural Namibian farmlands to the suburbs of small cities in the Nether-
lands, globalization has not rendered the physical landscape irrelevant, 
but, rather, is redefining the terms of the politics of space. Though soci-
ety in the global age may be increasingly detached from territory—no 
longer locked into specific localities—the symbolic value of territory 
and the particularities of locality retain their significance.
My project also presupposes that ongoing internal conflicts now 
play out on global stages, which reframe disputes over land. In addi-
tion to critiquing the rhetoric of policy and program design, I evaluate 
project implementation in each case in order to highlight how gov-
ernment failure to adequately supply social services can effectually 
undermine post-conflict reconciliation. Internal conflicts now play out 
through competing claims to space; divisions are reinforced by linger-
ing segregation and patterns of land ownership and residence. “The 
identity of a place emerges by the intersection of its specific involve-
ment in a system of hierarchically organized spaces with its cultural 
construction as a community or locality.”1 Thus, these localized con-
flicts bear both national and international significance, reflective of 
wider national and international contexts.
To illustrate the ongoing centrality of the state and its physical ter-
ritory, I have chosen to examine resettlement policies. In Namibia and 
the Netherlands these policies target populations based upon their 
perceived marginalization.
III. Resettling Peoples, Reinforcing Inequality: 
The San in Northeastern Namibia
Before delving into these issues, a word on terminology is necessary. 
When I refer to the San, I do not use the label uncritically. I understand 
the emergence of the San as a distinct ethnic group to be product of 
Namibia’s colonial history as well as an ongoing political process. I 
employ the term, however, because of its prominence in policy and 
advocacy. Those now classified as San in social policy consist largely of 
the peoples formerly referred to as Bushmen during colonial conquest 
in Southern Africa. San is a linguistic classification adopted in order to 
classify various groups in the region concentrated mainly in Botswana, 
South Africa, and Namibia. Ethnic identities are not only politicized, 
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but serve a distinct role in public policy. I aim to shed light on exter-
nal narratives of San identity as well as the national and international 
implications of labeling, rather than trying to reveal the self-conception 
of these peoples or the diverse identities lumped together under the 
label “San.” Thus, it is the political identity attached to ethnic group-
ings that I explore, not the meanings of these groupings themselves.
Following independence from colonial rule in 1990, Namibia’s gov-
ernment faced the tremendous challenge of reconstructing social wel-
fare programs. Apartheid rule in the colonial era was designed to lock 
a black majority into poverty. Decades of apartheid rule resulted in 
a lingering spatial isolation and socioeconomic stratification rivaling 
that in South Africa and Brazil. Though social welfare programs have 
the potential to help Namibians break out of these structures of isola-
tion and inequity, shortcomings in the provision of key services on 
the part of the state not only fail to transform the system, but can also 
serve to trap people in poverty and reinforce colonial era narratives. 
Insufficient healthcare in the face of a growing HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
inadequate education, and the lack of available housing are among 
the failures in social services that contribute to widespread frustration 
in a nation already largely disillusioned with the post-independence 
government.
Although land reform in Namibia attempts to deconstruct the social 
infrastructure of apartheid rule, the process has inadvertently under-
mined national reconciliation and failed to reverse the growing socio-
economic inequality. More than the simple reallocation of land from 
a white minority to a black majority, the reform process attempts to 
redefine land rights and tenure systems in order to redress inequity 
rooted in past injustice. While commercial land under freehold tenure 
plays a major role in the reform process, it is the redistribution of land 
through communal land reform and resettlement policy that directly 
impacts the majority of Namibians.
The 1997 National Resettlement Program (NRP) claims to empower 
landless Namibians, the poorest of the nation’s poor. Within this broad 
category of “formerly disadvantaged Namibians,” the NRP identifies 
the San as one of a few primary program beneficiaries. However, the 
NRP represents only the latest chapter in a long history of the dislo-
cation and relocation of the people now classified as the San. What 
is more, in order to resettle the San, policymakers must first locate 
them. In doing so, the state and non-governmental organizations alike 
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reinforce social narratives depicting the peripheral social status of the 
group as manifested by socio-spatial isolation and insecure tenure.
The NRP allocates tenure rights through Communal Land Boards 
and Traditional Authority structures. Though the government grants 
tenure rights, it keeps communal land in the hands of the state. Allocat-
ing leases of up to ninety-nine years for settlers, the Namibian govern-
ment ultimately “vests trust in the State for the benefit of ‘traditional’ 
communities.”2, 3 Hence, ethnic groups are accepted as political enti-
ties, and these identities and affiliations play an integral role in the 
construction of the state.
Despite the politicization of ethnic groups, ethnic divisions and dis-
crimination also dominate policy making and the political process. 
Group interests in the land reform process are furthered by repre-
sentatives on regional land boards, and many San communities and 
advocacy groups have expressed concern regarding the lack of rep-
resentation of San communities in regional land negotiations. The 
Ju/‘hoansi and !Xoo, based in Omaheke, were denied recognition by 
the government in 2001.4 The decision demonstrates the underlying 
lack of political power allocated to San groups. They are rendered pas-
sive recipients of government programs—targeted beneficiaries rather 
than participants in the reform process.
Insecure tenure is also symptomatic of this underlying lack of politi-
cal power. Although it is clear that contemporary tenure insecurity is 
rooted in past subjugation, according to the NRP, land reform is not 
to function as a form of reparations. As such, land rights will not be 
awarded based upon ancestral claims.
At the same time, the reform process aims to improve the socioeco-
nomic status of “formerly disadvantaged Namibians.” Thus, while the 
drafters of the reform process have attempted to avert the lengthy and 
ultimately impossible task of restoring pre-colonial land holdings, the 
political agenda underwriting the effort cannot be ignored. Transform-
ing the physical landscape, land reform is central to efforts to reclaim 
the political landscape following colonialism.
In another attempt to avoid controversy in the reform process, state 
policy classifies Namibian land by usage for the purposes of redistribu-
tion rather than according to holdings. The Ministry for Land Reform 
and Resettlement (MLRR) classifies land for reform purposes in terms 
of communal versus commercial areas. Such a division is a superficial 
one. The first consists of more agriculturally productive and commer-
cially oriented territories frequently owned by white Namibian farm-
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ers, and the second consists of land predominately populated by Black 
Namibians. Although liberated from formal apartheid rule, the divi-
sions stemming from apartheid policy remain firmly in place. In other 
words, the divisions between a minority elite land-owning class and 
the majority of the nation’s poor communal farmers persist.
While uneven patterns of land use in post-independence Namibia 
are the product of colonial era land seizures, the infrastructure of colo-
nial rule, the reform process avoids racial classifications. The choice to 
employ an alternative framework for understanding social divisions 
represents a conscious effort to move away from racial classifications, 
to promote a national consciousness that no longer functions along 
black and white lines. Though this approach attempts to avoid racial 
classifications, the reform process continues to employ ethnic terms, 
identifying the San as a distinct group and political entity for resettle-
ment purposes.
Turning to the controversial issue of expropriation, Namibia’s 
approach to commercial reform is guided by a willing buyer/willing 
seller model. It is notably passive when it comes to expropriating com-
mercial property. This type of policy stands as a dramatic divergence 
from the more radical socialist rhetoric underlining liberation era poli-
tics. Former president and leader in the liberation movement, Sam 
Nujoma, who oversaw the establishment of a number of key reform 
policies, including this one, noted that:
It has to be said that the Constitutional Principles document was formu-
lated by the Americans and the British to favour the interests of individ-
ual white settlers…It must be clearly stated that the inclusion of a clause, 
which serves to perpetuate the status quo of inequity in land distribution 
in Namibia, was never in line with SWAPO’s position in addressing the 
land question in Namibia. The inclusion of this clause has resulted in the 
problem of lands, which we have after the turn of the millennium.5
In light of the slow pace of commercial land acquisition for reform 
and resettlement, little has changed. Currently, 3,800 white commercial 
farmers maintain ownership of just under half of Namibia’s territory, 
while approximately one million black Namibians occupy communal 
areas. Without adequate commercial land on which to resettle landless 
Namibians, the majority of resettlement programs have taken place in 
communal areas. Relocating landless peasants into communal areas 
in the less agriculturally productive northern zone has not served as 
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an effective means of redistributing wealth or alleviating poverty. The 
expropriation of commercial farmlands is necessary in order to obtain 
adequate space for the resettlement of landless Namibians. Without 
sufficient land for resettlement, the NRP simply relocates poor farmers 
into new settlements where they continue to struggle to subsist. It does 
not tackle the greater task of transforming the structures underwriting 
the current inequitable distribution of land.
Further, by maintaining state ownership of communal lands, the 
process fails to award permanent title to beneficiaries. Instead, these 
programs award usufruct rights to use of the land and its resources, 
reinforcing a colonial era view of communal lands as peripheral areas 
of low agricultural productivity.
This points to the limits of land reform under Namibia’s national-
ist, liberation party government: “Traditional mainstream nationalism 
has turned yesterday’s natives into postcolonial settlers and postco-
lonial natives…Even with the colonial power gone, we keep defining 
every citizen as either a native or a settler!”6 The persistence of the 
dichotomy between settler and native in postcolonial resettlement in 
Namibia demonstrates that Namibians have yet to be liberated from 
colonial era structures for organizing power.
Compounding the situation, commercial farm expropriations dis-
place farm workers, many of whom identify as San. In this way, land 
reform that promotes expropriation also undermines its stated goals 
of serving the poor. The issue of dispossession as connected to expro-
priation demonstrates how communal resettlement and commercial 
reform are deeply intertwined and interdependent. Progress in one 
area is dependent upon progress in the other. Resettlement is thus an 
essential part of a larger process of reformulating the relationship of 
the people to the land. This is a process that would involve granting 
permanent tenure rights as well as transforming segregated residential 
patterns in urban as well as rural locations.
While the NRP involves the reallocation of tenure, it does little to 
promote alternative forms of tenure that could benefit the San. What 
is more, by failing to promote alternative tenure systems, resettlement 
programs perpetuate colonial era views regarding efficient versus inef-
ficient land use. Within this framework, San land use is frequently 
deemed unproductive and inefficient. “It is the government’s goal to 
get the other Bushmen who still lead a nomadic life to settle them in 
locations especially built for them…It is in any case the goal of the 
Catholic Mission to get Bushman out of nomadism,” reads one colonial 
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era document, “and to have them living in allocated areas as borders,” 
tenants on land owned by wealthy white Namibians.7
Though less overt in claiming that citizens’ use of the land must 
be in line with a certain national ideology or value system, the con-
temporary land reform process leaves little room for divergence from 
mainstream, commercially focused land practices. Nomadic land uses 
patterns widely practiced among San peoples are not legitimated by 
commercial definitions of tenure. Moreover, these hunter-gatherer 
based livelihoods are incompatible with animal grazing practiced by 
the majority of communal farmers in Namibia. Consequently, current 
resettlement policy does little to bring about the type of fundamental 
reform that could change the socioeconomic status of resettled peo-
ples.
Furthermore, while resettlement programs attempt to combat mar-
ginalization, these initiatives have perpetuated widespread percep-
tions of the San as a lazy and dependent subgroup. These notions 
have combined with official policy and program rhetoric to construct 
stereotypes of dependency. These attitudes have fueled discrimination, 
inciting internal violence and conflict among Namibians, hindering 
post-conflict reconciliation following apartheid and the struggle for 
liberation.
In addition, rights to the land in communal areas are allocated under 
the authority of traditional leaders, utilizing a system for consultation 
with the government tied to the divvying up of Namibian land into the 
ethnically divided homelands of the colonial era. In the latest phase of 
international indigenous rights legislation, environmental protections 
are increasingly incorporating indigenous people into their mandates, 
asserting their voice in provisions related to the land and its resources. 
Among these, the Convention on Biological Diversity, created in 1992, 
states that, “practices of indigenous and local communities [are] 
embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sus-
tainable use of biological resources.” Thus, community-based natural 
resource management programs must be placed within the context of 
broader trends in programs that seek to re-envision the relationship of 
communities to the land and its resources.
In his inaugural address, Namibian President Pohamba stated that, 
“traditional leaders are custodians of our cultural heritage; they are 
also promoters of our traditional values.”8 Yet, “traditional” is a broad 
and ambiguous label, which encompasses a wide variety of leadership 
structures and types of land usage. Tradition is not static, nor are the 
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wide array of livelihoods termed “traditional.” While deeming a prac-
tice as such grants it a certain cultural value, it also relegates it to the 
margins.
What is more, the elections of traditional authorities are not with-
out controversy, and issues of representation have plagued the reform 
process. The current tribal authority system draws from the leadership 
structures put into place during the colonial conquest. In this light, 
the continued use of many representatives for consultation in the land 
reform process today legitimizes notions of indigenous group identity 
through the homeland system.
As a window into the limitations of resettlement programs, I focus 
on two resettlement locations in the northeastern region of Omaheke, 
Skoonheid, and Drimiopsis. Approximately 8,000 people classified by 
the state as members of the San, including Ju/‘hoansi, Naro and !Xoo 
groups, live in the Omaheke, making the region home to one of the 
nation’s largest San populations.
In Skoonheid, resettlement began in 1993 on three farms, consisting 
of Herero, Damara, and Owambo residents in addition to a San major-
ity. Residents are mainly comprised of former commercial farm work-
ers new to communal agriculture, and are supported by Food for Work 
programs implemented by the government. This program is only the 
most recent in a long history of government subsidies targeting the San 
that exchange labor for food. It is as if the San exist outside of the wage 
labor system, and, as such, have become a type of “underclass.”9 The 
prominence of this type of welfare program in resettlement locations 
reinforces economic dependency and, consequently, the status of the 
San as a dependent sub-class.
Further, conditions of poverty have reinforced divisions among eth-
nic groups, straining communities and contributing to inter-ethnic con-
flict. Interviews with residents conducted through a recent survey by 
Namibia’s only public assistance law firm, the Legal Assistance Center 
(LAC), reveal internal conflicts running along ethnic lines. One Damara 
woman stated that, “The future…depends on whether the other tribe 
[the San] are able to change their attitude.”10 Another Damara resident 
explained that, “The relationship with the San community is not good. 
We are always told by the San people that this is their farm.”11 The 
statement speaks to how longstanding, competing claims to land con-
tribute to ongoing conflict in communities composed of residents of 
several ethnic affiliations. Thus, while it may not be possible to restore 
land based on ancestry, the injustice of dislocation and expropriation 
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manifested by tenure insecurity continues to shape the attitudes of 
beneficiaries regarding one another just as they undermine the coop-
eration necessary for the success of resettlement programs.
The words of one San resident also reveal this challenge: “If we get 
some space then it is not long before the blacks take it and bring in 
their cattle. When they come, they don’t see us and we must live under 
them…when we tell them to leave they say you are just a Bushman—
you cannot have land.”12
The statement reveals how attitudes regarding ethnicity can be 
employed in order to rationalize the denial of land rights to those clas-
sified as San. First of all, it is widely held that the San have been mar-
ginalized in terms of their rights to the land because they have never 
made claim to permanent land rights. This is a function of the exclu-
sion of the San from systems of land ownership as well as the nature 
of patterns of land use employed by many San. Rather than settling on 
a piece of land to raise livestock or grow crops, the San have tended to 
hunt and gather, dependent upon watering holes and wild animals for 
their subsistence. Thus, it has been easy for other groups to come into 
an area occupied by the San in order to utilize the land for their own 
purposes.
The language used regarding race in this instance is also extremely 
telling of lingering divides, and the transfer of the black and white 
divisions of apartheid into the postcolonial era. The speaker refers to 
“blacks” when discussing other ethnic groups, supporting a view of 
the San as a race apart from the majority black population, reinforcing 
the identification of the San as an indigenous minority and unique sub-
population.
Furthermore, employing the word “Bushman” as a label for the San 
ties contemporary identities into a colonial history. This is a history, 
that has worked to construct a homogenous identity based in part on 
the perception of deep-seated marginalization and subjugation of an 
ethnic group from a diverse group of people with a variety of tribal 
affiliations. “The Bushman think this place belongs to them,” another 
resident noted.13
Findings in nearby Drimiopsis also speak to the prevalence of con-
flicts among resettled peoples as well as expose flaws in program 
design. This smaller area, consisting of 120 family units, was originally 
intended to serve only as a temporary camp. Although many residents 
have moved on to Skoonheid, Drimiopsis remains overcrowded and 
occupied by temporary residents that have yet to officially register 
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with the government. As is the case in Skoonheid, the majority of resi-
dents are landless former large commercial farm laborers categorized 
as of San ancestry.
What limited social services are available are inaccessible to the 
majority of residents. Many are unable to afford school fees. Many 
cannot access water, because the diesel engines for pumps have been 
stolen. This theft is symptomatic of the frequency of crime, evidence of 
how the lack of governmental protections and police services under-
mines the successful implementation of social policy.
In another area of Omaheke, Animus, police have been accused of 
harassing San residents. According to a lawyer representing the vic-
tims of police harassment, officers confiscated vehicles and assaulted 
San children. These acts are one of a number of alleged rights viola-
tions and abuses of the San at the hands of the police. They are not 
isolated occurrences. In 1999, three traditional leaders made official 
complaints of “emotional harassment” by the Omaheke police and 
claimed that officers had broken into their homes and taken property. 
In another instance, police in Omaheke were accused of taking and 
consuming meat belonging to the San.14
Ongoing tensions in Skoonheid also demonstrate the broader con-
text of violence and conflict in the region. Domestic violence is report-
edly widespread, as are thefts. Another resident claimed that the San 
are “dirty” and stated that, “it is all the Bushman who are stealing our 
belongings.”15
The challenges involved in dealing with crime demonstrate how an 
underlying lack of basic social services can fuel inter-ethnic tensions. 
Without a police force, the people of Skoonheid are forced to settle dis-
putes themselves, which complicates relationships and creates conflict 
among community members.
Returning to the case of Dripmiosis, in addition to a monthly food 
package, many settlers are involved in MLRR’s Food for Work pro-
grams. Yet these programs fail to create economic independence. For 
instance, residents involved in the Food for Work scheme are required 
to work in a communal garden and must sell the surplus. Rather than 
reaping the rewards of their labor, they must put any profits earned 
into a bank account outside of the settlement.
One San resident, Dina, has spent her life as a domestic worker for 
whites in the region and has not found economic independence in 
Dripmiosis. Although she has ambitions to start her own business to 
generate some kind of income, resettlement has left her without the 
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tools to develop this ambition. Without the tools for economic inde-
pendence, beneficiaries are forced to either seek work on commercial 
farms, labor for wealthier communal farmers in the North, or continue 
to live in poverty on overcrowded communal lands.
According to Odendaal and Harring, the pervasive view of resettle-
ment beneficiaries, especially the San, as “loafers” has made its way 
into discussions at the level of the national government. Counter to 
this perception, researchers reported that, overall:
Resettlement projects are full of people with the desire to make a living, 
but frustrated by a lack of support and a lack of opportunity. Many are 
unemployed or underemployed so, on any given day, many people will 
be sitting around standing and not working.16
In both locations, national cohesion and reconciliation are under-
mined by the failure of the state to provide adequate support services 
or meet basic needs in resettled communities. Resettled San are locked 
into dependency, reinforcing their peripheral status and promoting 
discriminatory views of the San as a sub-population. Frequently dis-
located and unable to subsist on agricultural activity or to acquire 
employment in impoverished resettlement locations, many are forced 
to continue to seek work at commercial farms. As such, resettlement 
locations represent only a new stop in continuing cycles of dislocation 
tied to the spatial insecurity of landless Namibians.
NRP program administrators have even admitted to the failures 
of project implementation thus far. According to Namibia’s national 
newspaper, the Headman of Skoonheid, Frederick Langman, “said 
that he and his people are still not ‘feeling’ the fruits of freedom.”17 
Furthermore, in 2001 members of Omaheke’s resettled communities 
put forward an official complaint to the MLRR demanding that the 
ministry send a delegation to the area “to investigate pressing prob-
lems in their communities.”18 These problems include various inci-
dents involving harassment by both community members and police 
forces in addition to theft. Specifically, in 2004, a dozen members of the 
San community in the Omaheke region declared their intention to sue 
Herero communal farmers, claiming that these farmers strung up from 
a tree two individuals later identified as San residents. The incident 
demonstrates how conflicts over the land continue to be directly linked 
to violence. Although conflict may be declared officially over, these 
confrontations demonstrate that civil conflict persists. Confrontations 
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over rights to the land and land use serve as a platform through which 
internal tensions now play out, prolonging strife decades after the long 
war for liberation.
IV. The Moluccan Community: Perpetual Allochtoon?
Although the rise in popularity of nationalist politician Pim Fortuyn 
and the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gough made the weaknesses 
of multiculturalism in the Netherlands headline news, these incidents 
represent only the latest episode in a long history of the challenges of 
multicultural integration in the Netherlands. Ethnic Dutch and immi-
grant communities alike have long struggled to foster tolerance and 
social justice. The difficulty of such a task has been made particularly 
relevant in light of recent anti-Muslim hate crimes and widespread 
public fears of the Islamic community.
This fear of the “Other” and the hesitance of the majority to incor-
porate outside communities into Dutch society are not specifically 
attached to Dutch Muslims. Decades before the most recent resurgence 
in fears of terrorism and violence associated with Muslim immigrants, 
the Dutch were confronted with the threat of violence within their 
nation’s borders.
Examining the history of the Moluccan community in the Nether-
lands offers a window into the conflicts and contradictions embed-
ded in Dutch multiculturalism today. Dutch Moluccans have been 
frequently portrayed as an ideal immigrant group through the lens of 
an assimilationist model of integration, receiving labels like innocuous 
and well adjusted. Yet, just a few decades ago, Moluccans in the Neth-
erlands were associated with a series of terrorist attacks. These acts 
forced the people of the Netherlands to reconsider the nature of Dutch, 
Moluccan, and Dutch-Moluccan identities alike.
The formation of this hybrid identity began before the first members 
of the South Indonesian island population set foot in the Netherlands 
in 1951. Throughout the 20th century, Moluccans took on a unique role 
in the colonial ruling system in the Dutch East Indies. Following the 
economic decline of the regional spice trade, which had earned the 
islands the nickname Spice Islands, many Moluccans were recruited to 
serve as soldiers for the Dutch colonial army, the KNIL.
Nicknamed “Black Dutchmen,”19 Moluccan soldiers earned a repu-
tation for their loyalty to the Dutch crown. As in Namibia, national 
divisions were drawn along ethnic lines. Divide-and-rule tactics rein-
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forced ethnic differences. Compounding this fragmentation, many 
soldiers already identified themselves as standing on the fringes of 
Indonesian and Javanese society because they adhered to a minority 
Christian faith. Tapping into pre-existing factions for the benefit of 
consolidating colonial rule, Dutch colonial authorities classified the 
people of the Ambon islands, now referred to as the South Moluccas, 
as an ethnic minority. In an attempt to quell resistance to Dutch rule, 
colonial forces splintered opposition groups fighting for an indepen-
dent and unified Indonesia. To assist in this task, members of the KNIL 
were deployed throughout the East Indies in order to stifle internal 
upheaval and consolidate Dutch rule in the face of growing Indonesian 
resistance.
Testament to mounting separatism in the region, many Moluccans 
had their own political aspirations apart from national independence. 
In the wake of colonial rule, the former soldiers of the KNIL feared 
persecution for their service and allegiance to the crown. This political 
divide, the peripheral geography of the island territory, and the preva-
lence of a minority Christian faith in a predominantly Muslim culture 
all combined to foster an overarching sense of separateness within the 
Moluccan community in the region. This sense inspired one group of 
Moluccans to stake a claim to an independent republic in 1950. Just 
one year following the establishment of an independent Indonesia, 
the act marks the beginning of a long struggle for political autonomy, 
an ambition that has taken on symbolic meaning for Moluccans living 
abroad, as disputes over territory now persist into the beginning of the 
21st century.
Even at this early stage, nationalist organizing took place in a dis-
tinctly international arena. The U.N. worked alongside the Dutch and 
Javanese as the Moluccan community declared the Republic Malaku 
Selatan (RMS) through Article 2 of the 3rd Agreement in the draft 
of the new republic of Indonesia, which offered national factions the 
opportunity to opt out of the emerging and newly unified nation. 
Moluccans in the Netherlands advocating the political autonomy of 
the RMS throughout the middle of the last century also directed claims 
toward the U.N., appealing to the supranational body through various 
political factions fighting for the RMS in Indonesia and abroad.
Moreover, this struggle for an autonomous republic had taken on 
symbolic value for the community resettled in the Netherlands. Fol-
lowing World War II, approximately 12,000 of the 25,000 demobilized 
Moluccan KNIL soldiers were repatriated to the Netherlands and 
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placed in camps throughout the country. This program was originally 
conceived of as a temporary arrangement intended to repay ex-soldiers 
for their loyalty to the crown by allowing them (and their families) a 
safe exile in the Netherlands. Not intended to serve as a permanent 
solution, resettlement programs failed to consider the long term. These 
former military servants and their families found themselves in iso-
lated settlements that included former concentration camps, such as 
Schattenberg and Bught. The act that was once intended to do justice 
for the subjects that put in the hard labor to establish the empire was 
plainly inadequate in recognizing the former soldiers for their service.
Such treatment through resettlement revealed the contradictions 
inherent in the Moluccans‘ social status in the Netherlands. Although 
technically citizens of the Dutch colonial empire, spatial marginaliza-
tion reinforced social marginalization, a condition designed by Dutch 
policy. After Moluccans moved out of the camps, they were relocated 
to isolated communities, to gated neighborhoods on the outskirts of 
small cities. Locked into the periphery, Moluccans found themselves 
living alongside rather than among the Dutch.
This is but one example of how the Dutch “Pillarization” model 
of integration has fostered “remarkable subcultural segmentation…of 
society in general.”20 Social distance based on perceived cultural differ-
ence was reflected by spatial segregation and uneven control over the 
landscape. Here, in much the same way as in Namibia, spatial insecu-
rity, segregation, and lack of land rights undermine national cohesion. 
“The dilemma here is that while the population on the ground is mul-
tiethnic, the authority, the law, and the definition of rights are mono- or 
uni-ethnic. The consequence is to divide the population ethnically…
[postcolonial] clashes about rights are less and less racial, more and 
more ethnic.”21
As the years passed, supposedly temporary resettlement conditions 
in the Netherlands revealed themselves as permanent living situations. 
Former soldiers and their families struggled to remain united across 
various cities through the struggle for self-determination. “Proud sol-
diers felt emasculated, quickly grabbing onto the RMS ideal to salvage 
meaning in their lives.”22 Today, the “RMS ideal” is discussed more 
frequently as an ideology than as a real political project. The symbolic 
value awarded to the struggle speaks to the meaning of rights to land 
and the power of space as a means of asserting political autonomy. 
Locked into the outskirts, Dutch Moluccans found themselves in a 
kind of double bind of marginalization and placelessness. In exile from 
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the South Moluccas, where civil conflict persists, while simultaneously 
locked into the margins of Dutch society, the community has been 
united by a homeland that exists only in their collective imagination.
In view of this situation, the series of attacks organized by a small 
group of second-generation Moluccan youths in the mid-1960s takes 
on a renewed social and political significance for the larger Moluccan 
community and among the Dutch as a whole. The youths that engaged 
in this struggle through violent occupations were symbolically claim-
ing territory as part of a struggle for rights to space beyond Dutch bor-
ders as they worked to assert the political autonomy of the RMS. They 
gained notoriety by seizing the Indonesian Embassy and later hijack-
ing a number of trains throughout the 1970s. Tensions came to a head 
when the group occupied an elementary school in May of 1987. By this 
point, the group had garnered international fame. Within the Nether-
lands, the hijackings and their aftermath forced the Dutch people to 
confront a community that had been relegated to the margins.
This chapter in the struggle for political autonomy also took on a 
distinctly international character. The youths were inspired by grass-
roots movements outside of their nation’s borders, drawing from the 
Black Power movement in the United States. Today, Dutch Moluccans 
continue to speak of the RMS ideal, and protests have been organized 
in The Hague throughout the past decade in solidarity with ongoing 
nationalism supporting the RMS and civil conflict in Indonesia.
Furthermore, the consequent stigmatization of Dutch Moluccans 
as being associated with terrorist activity has worked to transform the 
social identity of the community. Many have returned to government-
sanctioned neighborhoods where a sizeable portion of the popula-
tion continues to reside, a testament to the lasting impact of policies 
designed to divide.
Additionally, persistent spatial and social peripheralization demon-
strates the limits of the pillarization model for integration. It is a model 
that has functioned as the cornerstone of Dutch multiculturalism. Yet 
it features an ideology that is met with increasing skepticism as social 
divisions and tensions permeate the national dialogue on immigration. 
“ ‘Multiculturalism’ is both a feeble acknowledgment of the fact that 
cultures have lost their moorings in definite places and an attempt to 
subsume this plurality of cultures within the framework of a national 
identity.”23
As such, multiculturalism assumes cultural difference to be a threat 
to national cohesion and stability. However, “a heterogeneous nation is 
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not necessarily less capable of solidarity than a homogeneous one.”24 
The idea that difference is inherently a threat to national cohesion is 
present in both the Netherlands and Namibia. Thus, programs and 
policies that target beneficiaries based on ethnic difference contradict 
national ideologies regarding social cohesion.
Returning to the case of the Moluccan community in the Nether-
lands, the government has launched a number of policies that target 
Moluccans in order to prevent the type of dissatisfaction that can con-
tribute to the radicalization witnessed in the Sixties and Seventies. 
From promises to pay reparations through an organization known 
as the CAZ to educational associations like ISEM and the Moluccan 
History Museum based in Utrecht, a number of social programs now 
target the Dutch-Moluccan community in the Netherlands. The violent 
incidents have forced the Dutch government to reconsider a group that 
had once been conceived as model citizens, able to fit into the Dutch 
multicultural system by remaining locked into the social and spatial 
periphery.
Though generations of Dutch of Moluccan ancestry have lived their 
lives in the Netherlands, the term allochtoon is continually employed to 
describe members of the community. The name refers to second-gen-
eration immigrants and implies residual outsider status and lingering 
connotations of foreignness despite official citizenship. The persistence 
of the term in popular language stands as a testament to the limits of 
Dutch-Moluccan integration to this day.
V. Reinforcing Marginalization: 
The Ethnic Minority in Policy and Advocacy
Resettlement is inherently a political act. “If one begins with the prem-
ise that spaces have always been hierarchically interconnected, instead 
of naturally disconnected, then cultural and social change becomes 
not a matter of cultural contact and articulation but one of rethink-
ing difference through connection.”25 While apartheid era Southern 
Africa organized society along racial lines, the contemporary political 
discourse in Namibia and the Netherlands uses ethnicity to classify 
and to categorize. Although race is largely associated with discrimina-
tion, recognized for its role as a tool of oppression throughout history, 
ethnic difference is widely accepted as a legitimate means of identify-
ing members of society. The perception is that while society no longer 
subscribes to racist ideologies, ethnic divides persist and undermine 
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national cohesion. While race may be widely rejected as an appropri-
ate means of classifying, ethnicity persists as a legitimate quality for 
dividing peoples in each case. Though resettlement programs, which 
attempt to tackle spatial marginalization, the political construction of 
the ethnic minority through public policy and advocacy have actually 
perpetuated the perceived separateness of these groups. Policies in 
both countries identify program targets by establishing their vulner-
ability. Identifying the San as a distinct group based upon a shared 
history of victimization, their cause has now been taken up by trans-
national organizations as well as appropriated by groups that claim to 
advocate for indigenous or immigrant rights at the global level.
This notion of the ethnic minority represents a uniquely local iden-
tity at the same time as it functions as a universal label.
As groups migrate, regroup in new locations, reconstruct their histories, 
and reconfigure their ethnic ‘projects’ the ethno in ethnography takes 
on a slippery, nonlocalized quality. Groups are no longer tightly terri-
torialized, spatially bounded, historically unselfconscious, or culturally 
homogeneous.26
The notion of a sub-group, a minority, which stands apart from the 
majority, cuts across national lines. Ethnicity, however, has played a 
unique social role in each context rooted in the colonial era and influ-
enced by trends in contemporary global politics and national develop-
ments. Although the Dutch were former colonizers and Namibia was a 
former colonial holding, the ideologies that have legitimized the colo-
nial project in each society continue to shape contemporary thought. 
In both nations, race and ethnicity have served distinct social functions 
and played key roles in the organization of the social landscape.
Understanding the meaning of race and ethnicity in contemporary 
politics necessitates an exploration of the meaning of the terminology 
in the colonial era. While the Dutch took on the role of colonizer and 
Namibia the colonized, the ideology that grounded the colonial project 
in each continues to inform and impact the politics of identity in each 
nation. In Namibia, an indigenous majority now stands apart from the 
ethnic minority classified as indigenous as well, yet regarded as cultur-
ally distinct.
Thus, the ethnic minority in both Namibian and Dutch policy must 
be understood in terms of the historical and political connotations sur-
rounding the social construction of ethnicity in each setting. Narratives 
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of the global political arena, like that offered by the “Clash of Civiliza-
tions,” suggest that the world’s people resort to ethnic affiliations. This 
ideology suggests that ethnic identities are somehow natural. Yet, to 
reiterate, “a heterogeneous nation is [not] necessarily less capable of 
solidarity than a homogenous one.”27
Contemporary public policy can also legitimize ethnic divisions. In 
Namibia, rights associated with ethnicity differ from those attached to 
citizenship. Ethnic groups are dealt with as communities, represented 
by official, often externally appointed, “traditional” authorities in gov-
ernment negotiations. Citizens, on the other hand, participate in demo-
cratic national processes as individuals.28
In the Netherlands, ethnicity can also qualify citizenship. Immi-
grants are defined first by ethnic ancestry, while Dutch citizenship—
national identity—is secondary. In both cases, ethnicity is inherited and 
portrayed as a simplistic, instinctual allegiance to a group identity. The 
social narrative implied by this type of policy is that race is somehow 
externally imposed as opposed to internally defined by communities 
in the same way as ethnicity. In contemporary politics, this is espe-
cially significant because it implies that ethnicity is somehow more 
legitimate. It is “natural” and authentic, specific to the unique qualities 
and characteristics of those that it classifies. Moreover, the persistence 
of ethnic labeling reinforces divisions between cultures, despite their 
plurality in the Dutch multicultural context.
What is more, the language employed in policy generally classi-
fies actors in terms of settlers and beneficiaries. The term beneficiaries 
implies a one-sided dynamic in social policy. It suggests that those 
resettled are the passive recipients of government assistance, subsi-
dized by the government in the reform process. The failure of the state 
to adequately deliver social services in Namibia has reinforced patterns 
of dependency and locked program beneficiaries into a subsistence 
livelihood through the welfare state. Similarly, it was dissatisfaction 
with resettlement conditions and the failure of the Dutch government 
to make good on the promise of establishing an independent RMS that 
inspired civil conflict in the Seventies. Both cases illuminate how inad-
equate social services lock citizens into dependency, contributing to 
lingering social conflict through contestations over space.
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VI. The Global Dimensions of National Conflicts: 
New Platforms for Social Change
Despite new transnational alliances and international development ini-
tiatives, the gap between the global rich and poor continues to widen. 
The conceptualization of a global apartheid by lobbying groups and 
activists around the world presupposes that a globalized economic 
structure reinforces socioeconomic underdevelopment in the South. 
Though this dividing line is broadly drawn between hemispheres, it 
is similar to those dividing former colonizers from colonies, the West 
from the rest, or the developed from the developing world. It is one 
of countless other terms intended to categorize the world to reflect 
global inequality. Proponents of the framework argue that globaliza-
tion polarizes the distribution of wealth and perpetuates the marginal-
ization of the nations of the Global South.
Yet this depiction of the global world order is extremely simplistic, 
and denies the interconnections between the dualities. Though apart-
heid is Dutch for “separate,” the two spheres constructed through 
apartheid rule do not function in a vacuum from one another. Rather, 
apartheid works by dictating the terms of interaction. Isolation com-
bines with limited interaction to perpetuate the status quo. Creating 
distinct social and economic spheres, apartheid rule in Southern Africa 
exploited spatial divides in order to create an infrastructure that rein-
forced systems of power. In the case of Namibia, this consolidated 
power into the hands of a white elite. In the contemporary world polit-
ical order, this implies that power is now in the hands of an elite in the 
Global North.
Looking at segregation only at the macro level, however, fails to 
acknowledge the diversity that exists in the local context. The myth 
of a Global South denies the diversity that exists within nations and 
regions, and among peoples. The globalization process is unique in 
that it transforms the global along local lines and the local along global 
lines. Thus, local divisions are not only symptomatic of inequity, but 
also serve as its structural reinforcement at the micro level.
Still, the narrative of a global apartheid perpetuates perceptions 
regarding the exclusion of Africa from the globalization process, 
especially the economic dimensions of globalization. “The developed 
countries of the North have lost all sense of the noble idea of human 
solidarity,”29 Mbeki argued at a conference in 1999. On another occa-
sion, the South African president claimed that, “the process of global-
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ization is an objective outcome of the development of the productive 
forces that create wealth.”30 Moreover, this sense of peripheral status 
as depicted through narratives regarding Africa’s marginalization, the 
notion that Africa has failed to “harness the processes of globaliza-
tion,”31 suggests that an entire continent has been flatly excluded in 
the global era. It denies the interconnections and systems of exploita-
tion that dictate the terms of global politics and economics. Hence, 
to appropriately use the apartheid system as a paradigm for under-
standing structures and systems of power in the era of globalization, 
one must recognize how segregation constructs socio-spatial divisions 
that reinforce uneven power dynamics at multiple levels. Globaliza-
tion does not flatten. It is therefore essential to recognize how space, 
both in terms of its symbolic and economic value, creates a founda-
tion for wealth as well as a means of perpetuating social inequity and 
exclusion.
Beyond their specific social contexts, new processes of working 
for international justice and transnational advocacy are connecting 
local conflicts to global struggles, creating a new transnational public 
sphere.32 In this light, confrontations over space can serve as a new 
platform through which the world’s people may strive to work for 
social change. Tackling the spatial manifestations of socio-political 
inequality can serve as a venue for addressing underlying social con-
flict. This is a task made particularly relevant in light of rapid develop-
ments in international justice and law in the global era. It represents 
harnessing the power of globalization’s processes to work for change 
as part of the cultivation of a global ethic as envisioned by Peter Singer 
in One World, and other contemporary ethicists and social theorists 
of the global age. Indeed, globalization transforms the internal realm 
in addition to the external, forcing us to re-evaluate how we observe a 
global phenomenon in addition to that phenomenon itself.
It is within this larger, globalized framework for understanding the 
meaning that is attached to rights to space that initiatives to reform ten-
ure and redistribute the land can reconcile conflicts at the international 
level. This demands the reconceptualization of rights to space as well 
as the deconstruction of the identities through which land ownership 
and occupational rights are organized. It is a task that is essential in 
harnessing the processes of globalization to work for a social change. 
The global era presents an unparalleled opportunity for the transfor-
mation of intra- and inter-national divisions alike, for the transforma-
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tion of the social and political landscape, as we confront inequity as it 
is expressed through the physical. •
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